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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
TERRA-WEST, INC, an Idaho corporation,
PlaintiffIRespondent,
v.
IDAHO MUTUAL TRUST, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
DefendantIAppellant,
And
MIICE URWIN ENTERPRISES, INC., an
Idaho corporation; RED CLIFF
DEVELOPMENT, INC., an Idaho
corporation; ALLOWAY ELECTRICAL
WHOLESALE SUPPLY CO., INC., and
Idaho corporation; KRISTEN R.
THOMPSON, an individual; ALL
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
POSSESSION,
Defendants.
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case comes to the Court on an interlocutory appeal from the district court's
grant to the Plaintiff/Respondent of leave to amend its Complaint to add a cause of action
to enforce a claim of lien. The district court's discretionary grant of leave should be
affirmed on appeal because the motion to amend timely coininenced proceedings to
enforce the lien within the six-month limitations period set forth in Idaho Code $ 45-510,
and because even if such motion had itself been untimely, it would relate back to the
original complaint which arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence.
11. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Appellant Terra-West Inc. ("Terra-West") is a company based in Caldwell, Idaho,
which specializes in excavation and preparing property for construction. In 2006, TerraWest agreed to provide Red Cliff Development Inc. ("Red Cliff') with excavation and
irrigation related labor and materials for the development of an approximately 40 acre
parcel of property to be known as the Sadie Creek Subdivision. R, p. 90. Terra-West
began work in the August of 2006. R. p. 90.
During the course of Terra-West's performance, Red Cliff entered into an
agreement with Mike Unvin Enterprises ("Unvin") in which Urwin purchased the
development from Red Cliff, and also assumed all obligations and agreements for the
development, including Red Cliffs agreement with Terra-West. R. p. 90. Terra-West
continued its performance through November 30, 2007, at which point the work remaining
under the contract included certain excavation and irrigation work and the installation of
pipelines. Further work, however, was impossible until Unvin could obtain government
approval for certain other irrigation work required under the contract.

Since Terra-West had not been fully paid for its work on the subdivision and was
uncertain as to when Urwin would, if ever, obtain the necessary government approvals
necessary for Terra-West to complete its work under its agreement with Red CliffIUrwin,
Terra-West recorded a Claim of Lien with the Ada County Recorder on December 6, 2007.
R. p. 91. This Claim of Lien was served upon the owners, or reputed owners, of the
property the following day. R. p. 91.
In May, 2008, Terra-West had still not been fully paid for its work. Accordingly,
on May 30, 2008, Terra-West filed the present action in the District Court of the Fourth
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, which was within the
six month statutory time period for the initiation of a foreclosure action pursuant to Idaho
Code 5 45-510. R. p. 6-13. Terra-West's Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial included
causes of action for foreclosure of its lien on the subdivision property against all persons
and entities claiming an interest in the property, as well as for unjust enrichment and for
breach of contract by Urwin. R. p. 6-13. The case was assigned to the Honorable Ronald
J. Wilper.
Idaho Mutual Trust, LLC, ("Idaho Mutual") brought a motion to dismiss with respect
to the portion of the suit concerning foreclosure of Terra-West's lien. R. p. 28-29. On
Septanber 3,2008, the district court ruled in favor of Idaho Mutual's motion, concluding that
statement in the lien that the signer was "knowledgeable of the matters stated therein and
verily believes the same to be true and just" was inadequate to satisfy the requirement in
Idaho Code 5 45-507(4) that the lien claimant verify by oath that he or she believes the lien
claim to be just. R. p. 31-34. The present suit continued however, since there were remaining

claims to be resolved. Idaho Mutual did not seek, nor did it receive, an Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 54(b) certificate of final judgment permitting it to exit the suit.
Shortly before the suit was filed, Urwin notified Terra-West that it had finally
received government approval (with certain conditions) to complete the Sadie Creek
Subdivision. Urwin instructed Terra-West to resume work pursuant to the 2006 contract.
Terra-West complied, providing labor and materials for the improveinent of the property until
its work on the Sadie Creek Subdivision was substantially completed on May 25,2008. R. p.
91.
Less than 90 days later, on August 12,2008, Terra-West filed a Second Claim of Lien
with the Ada County Recorder, reflecting the additional work performed and the new amount
owed to Terra-West as a result. R. p. 91. A copy of this Second Claim of Lien was served by
certified mail upon the owners, or reputed owners, of the property. R. p. 91.
Terra-West remained unpaid for its work, and so less than six months later, on
January 16, 2006, Terra-West moved to amend its Complaint in the present action to recover
pursuant to the Second Claim of Lien. R. p. 37-62. The district court granted the motion to
amend on April 22, 2009, and the Amended Coinplaint was filed the following day. R. p. 80110. Idaho Mutual filed a motion seeking permission to appeal from the district court's
interlocutory order, which was denied. Idaho Mutual then sought and received permission
fioin the Idaho Supreme Court to file an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate
Rule 12. Idaho Mutual's appeal is now before the Court.

111. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Is Terra-West entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 5
12-121?

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) states that "a party may amend a pleading only by
leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires...." I.R.C.P. 15(a); see also Clarlc v. Olsen, I10 Idaho 323, 326,715 P.2d
993, 996 (1986); Smith v. Shinn, 82 Idaho 141, 149, 350 P.2d 348 (1960); Marlrstaller v.
Markrtaller, 80 Idaho 129, 134, 326 P.2d 994 (1958). Idaho courts "should favor liberal

grants of leave to amend." Wickstrom v. North Idaho College, 111 Idaho 450, 725 P.2d

[Tlhe purpose of the rule is two-fold: First, to allow the best chance for each
claim to be determined on its merits rather than on some procedural
technicality; and, second, to relegate pleadings to the limited role of
providing parties with notice of the nature of the pleader's claim and the
facts that have been called into question. Issue formulation is to be left to
the discovery process and pleadings are not to be viewed as carrying the
burden of fact revelation or of controlling the trial phase of the action.
Clark, 110 Idaho at 326, 715 P.2d at 996 (citing C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure, Civil 2d § 1471 (1971)).

New theories of recovery may be raised when the basic facts that gave rise to the
recovery have not changed. Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 272-73, 561
P.2d 1299, 1305-06 (1977). The Idaho Supreme Court has "placed the burden of showing
why a court should not grant leave to amend a complaint on the parties opposed to the
amendment." Clark, 110 Idaho at 326, 715 P.2d at 996; Smith, 98 Idaho at 272-73, 561
P.2d at 1305-06. "Amendment to pleadings should be allowed within the discretion of the
trial court, and such exercise of discretion will not be disturbed absent a showing of clear
error." Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 270, 688 P.2d 1172, 1175 (1984). Alnendlnent
should be allowed "unless to do so would deprive the complaining party of some

substantial right." Ada County Highway District v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 875, 673
P.2d 1067, 1069 (1983).
"The purpose of the mechanic's lien statutes is remedial in nature and seeks to provide
protection to laborers and Inaterialmen who have added directly to the value of the property of
another by their materials and labor." Baker v. Boren, 129 Idaho 885, 934 P.2d 951 (Ct.App.
1997). Idaho's "lien statutes are to be liberally construed 'with a view to effect their objects
and promote justice."' Id. (quoting Metropolitan L f e Ins. Co. v. First Security Bank ofldaho,
94 Idaho 489,493,491 P.2d 1261,1265 (1971)).
V. ARGUMENT

Idaho Mutual's interlocutory appeal is predicated on its theory that the amendment
to Terra-West's complaint to include the Second Clailn of Lien was untimely. Idaho
Mutual's argument, however, is without merit for two reasons. First, the Second Claim of
Lien was timely since it was filed within 90 days of the coinpletion of work in compliance
with Idaho Code § 45-507, and proceedings to enforce the lien were commenced by the
motion to amend within six months after the claim of lien was filed. Second, even if the
motion to amend Terra-West's complaint had not commenced enforcement proceedings,
the amended complaint would nonetheless be timely because pursuant to Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(c) it would relate back to the date the original complaint was filed.
A. The Amended Complaint was timely because the operative date for the
commencement of proceedings to enforce the Second Claim of Lien was the date
the motion to amend was filed.

Idaho's mechanic's lien statutes provide that one who "surfaces or otherwise
improves any land" has a lien upon the land for the labor, materials, and services furnished.
I.C. 5 45-501. The relevant time constraints are set out in two statutes: Idaho Code

5 45-

507 and Idaho Code 5 45-510. The first of these, Idaho Code 45-507, provides that any
claim of lien must be "filed within ninety (90) days after the completion of the labor or
services, or furnishing of materials." I.C.

5 45-507(2).

The second statute, Idaho Code 5

45-510, provides that in order to enforce such a lien, proceedings must be commenced
within six months of the date the lien was filed.
In the present case, Terra-West substantially completed work on the subject
property on May 25, 2008. The Second Claim of Lien was filed with the Ada County
Recorder on August 12, 2008, and copies were served 011 the owners or reputed owners of
the property. This filing was less than 90 days after worlc was completed, and was thus
timely under Idaho Code 3 45-507. Then, on January 16, 2009, Terra-West filed a motion
to amend its coinplaint so as to enforce the Second Claim of Lien. This motion was filed
approximately five months after the Claim of Lien was recorded, and was accordingly
timely under the six-month limit imposed pursuant to Idaho Code 3 45-510.
Idaho Mutual's argument that the amendment was untimely is based on drawing a
distinction between the date the motion to amend was filed

-

which was less than six

months after the lien was filed - and the date the district court actually issued its ruling
approving the motion - which was more than six months after the lien was filed. Idaho
Mutual asserts that a lnotion to amend an existing complaint cannot "commence" an action
pursuant to Idaho Code 5 45-510 because an amended. complaint is not deemed to be filed
until it is submitted following a grant of leave to amend by the court. Idaho Mutual
contends that a claimant in Terra-West's position seeking to meet the six month statutory
period must either (1) file a lnotion to amend and hope that the district court issues its
ruling quickly, or (2) file a new colnplaint beginning a second action concerning the

performance of the same contract, effect service to all the same parties again, and then
move to consolidate that second lawsuit to the action already pending.
The difficulty with Idaho Mutual's argument is that the rule it proposes - that an
amended complaint is not deemed filed for timeliness purposes until it is submitted as a
separate document after a formal grant of leave by the court

-

does not actually exist.

Indeed, the firmly established rule is the exact opposite of that suggested by Idaho Mutual.
"[Tlhe settled rule in both federal and state court is that a colnplaint is deemed filed as of
the time it is submitted to a court together with a request for leave to file the amended
pleading." Buller Tvuclcing Co. v. Owner Operator Independent Driver Risk Retention
Group, Inc, 461 F.Supp.2d 768,776-77 (S.D. Ill. 2006). Once filed, "the motion to ainend
stands in place of the actual ainended complaint while the motion is under review by the
court." Frazier v. East Tenn. Baptist Hospital, Inc., 55 S.W.3d 925 (Tenn. 2001). It is the
filing of the motion to amend, not the court's later ruling on the motion or the even later
subnlission of the amended complaint that determines the date on which the action is
"commenced" for the purposes of Rule 3. Nett v. Bellucci, 774 N.E.2d 130, 138-39 (Mass.
2002).
The application of the rule is illustrated in Mauney v. Morris, 340 S.E.2d 397 (N.C.
1986), where the North Carolina Supreme Court considered a set of facts siinilar to the
present case and under a siinilar procedural posture. In Mauney, the plaintiff filed a
complaint which he later moved to amend to add a claim of lien. Id. at 399. At the time
the plaintiff filed his motion to ainend, the claim of lien was within the statutory time limit.
Id. at 400. However, by the time the trial court got around to ruling on the motion to
amend the following month, that time limit had expired. Id. Applying the national rule,

the Mauney court rejected the same argument now offered by Idaho Mutual, observing that
"[tlhe date of the filing of the motion, rather than the date that the court rules on it, is the
crucial date in measuring the period of limitations." Id. Accordingly, the court in Mauney
held that the plaintiffs amendment to add a claim of lien was timely based on the date the
motion to amend was filed - without regard to the date on which the trial court actually
ruled on the motion or on which the amended complaint itself was submitted. Id.
The reason for the rule was set out in the frequently quoted case of Gloster v. Penn.
Railroad Co., 214 F.Supp. 207,208 (W.D. Penn. 1963). The court wrote:
The filing of the complaint, and not final court approval was sufficient to
meet the requirements of Rule 3. . . . To give sanction to objections to the
a~neud~nent,
that leave to amend must await the actual placement of the
judge's signature on an order to amend, would to lend impracticality and
injustice to federal judicial process and procedure. . . . The Court had need
for researching and deliberating upon the law as applied to the facts of the
case, and this had to be done while applying time and energy to the many
other matters in a busy court. The necessary time so consumed . . . should
not and cannot be permitted as an obstacle to justice. Such is the
intendment and spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id. Another court summarized the basis of the rule by noting that "[ilf the date of
commencement is based on when the court grants the motion to amend rather than when
the plaintiff files the motion and proposed complaint, the plaintiff is left with uncertainty
over whether the statute of limitations requirelnents will ever be met. The matter is out of
the hands of the plaintiff and is controlled by the vagaries of the court's workload. The
better rule is that the action is commenced when the plaintiff files the motion to anlend and
the proposed complaint irrespective of when the court grants the motion to amend." The
Children's Store v. Cody Enterprises, Inc., 580 A.2d 1206, 1210 (Vt. 1990) (emphasis in
the original).

The Supreme Judicial Court o f Massachusetts set forth a particularly thorough
analysis o f the rule in Nett v. Bellucci, 774 N.E.2d 130 (Mass. 2002). The court wrote:
While the plaintiff has unilateral control over when [the motion to amend]
is filed, the plaintiff has no way o f controlling or even predicting the time at
which any permission to amend will be granted, and thus no ability to
control the date on which the amended conlplaint itself may be filed. It may
take only a matter o f days before the motion is allowed and the complaint
can be filed, but it may be a matter o f weeks, or even months, depending on
a host o f factors, all o f which are outside the plaintiffs control. I f the
statute o f repose cannot be satisfied until the later filing o f the amended
complaint after the motion to amend has been allowed, the repose period
will effectively be shortened by sonle unpredictable amount o f time, as a
plaintiff would have to file the motion to ainend some considerable period
in advance o f the expiration o f the repose period and si~nplyhope that the
court's ruling would be sufficiently prompt. It is only that first step, the
filing o f the motion, that the plaintiff can control. Thus, the filing o f the
motion is colnparable to the original filing o f the complaint, both in the
sense that each is the first step that the plaintiff takes and the first document
that the plaintiff files with the court concerning the action, and in the sense
that both the filing o f the original coinplaint and the filing o f the motion to
amend are steps that remain unilaterally in the plaintiffs control.
Id. at 136.

The court in Nett considered and rejected the process proposed in the present case
by Idaho Mutual: that a plaintiff seeking to timely amend its complaint should he required
to file and serve an entirely new lawsuit, and then move to consolidate the new lawsuit
with the action already pending between the parties. Id. at 136-37. The court noted that
requiring such a process would waste tiine and judicial resources, as well as encourage
undesirable litigation tactics. Id. The court observed that the approach now urged by
Idaho Mutual:
would waste scarce judicial resources and impose pointless litigation costs. .
. . [I]tcreates needless confusion and duplication to force the plaintiff to
bring the claiin as a separate action, followed by a motion for consolidation,
merely to avoid the bar o f the statute o f repose. Indeed, the plaintiff might
well file a motion to amend, wait to see whether the motion would be

allowed in time to get the amended complaint filed before the repose period
ran out, and, i f there were still no ruling from the court as the expiration
date drew near, file the separate action and the accompanying motion to
consolidate. W e fail to see how such duplication o f effort and procedural
clutter would advance the purposes underlying the statute o f repose.
Id. at 136-37.

'

'

The volume o f reported decisions applying the rule that a inotion to amend stands
in the place o f an amended coinplaint while the motion is under review by the court
precludes an exhaustive listing o f such cases. The following, however, is a non-exhaustive
sampling: Schillinger v. Union Pacffic Railroad Co., 425 F.3d 330, 334-35 (7th Cir. 2005)
(courts look to the date the motion to amend was filed when determining the timeliness o f
an amended complaint); Newby v. Enron Corp., 542 F.3d 463, 470 (5th Cir. 2008)
(detennining timeliness o f an amended complaint based on the date o f the inotion to
amend); Moore v. State ofIndiana, 999 F.2d 1125, 1131 (7th Cir. 1993) (motion to amend
satisfies limitations period in place o f the later amended complaint); Mayes v. AT & T
Information Systems, Inc., 867 F.2d 1172, 1173 (8th Cir. 1989) (motion to amend

constitutes the "cominencement" o f an action for the purposes o f Rule 3 in lieu o f later
amended complaint); Buller Trucking Co, 461 F.Supp.2d at 776-77 ("the settled rule i11
both federal and state court is that a complaint is deemed filed as o f the time it is submitted
to a court together with a request for leave to file the amended pleading"); Bradley v.
Armstrong Rubber Co., 46 F.Supp.2d 583, 586-87 (S.D. Miss. 1999) (where motion to

amend was filed within the statutory period, it stands in place o f the later amended
motion); In re Glacier Bay, 746 F.Supp. 1379, 1389-90 (D.Alaska 1990) (amended
complaint was timely where the motion to amend was filed within the limitations period);
Wallace v. Shenvin Williams Co., Inc., 720 F.Supp. 158-59 (D.Kan. 1988) ("The court

holds that plaintifl's amended complaint was effectively filed when his motion for leave to
file an amended coinplaint was filed on May 20, 1988. To hold otherwise would punish
plaintiff and other similarly situated plaintiffs for the court's unavoidable delay in issuing
an order granting leave to amend a complaint"); Pearson v. Niagara Machine & Tool
Works, 701 F.Supp. 195, 196 (N.D. Okla. 1988) (amendments timely where motion to
amend was submitted within the statutory period); Eaton Covp. v. Appliance Valves Co.,
634 F.Supp. 974, 982-83 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (amended co~nplainttimely if the motion for
leave to amend was submitted within the statutory period); Longo v. Penn. Electric Co.,
618 F.Supp. 87 (W.D. Penn. 1985) ("The timely filing of this Motion to Amend and not
the final coui-l approval was sufficient to meet the requirement of Fed.R.Civ.P. 3 that 'a
civil action is colninenced by the filing of a complaint with the court"'); Glosler, 214
F.Supp. at 208 (filing of the motion to amend constituted commencement of an action);
Nett, 774 N.E.2d at 139-40 ("We find considerable supporting authority in other
jurisdictions, which (in the absence of any 'relation back' provisions) take the position that
the filing of the motion to amend, not the court's later ruling on that motion or the even
later filing of the complaint following allowance of that that motion, is the date on which
the new action is commenced"); Totura & Co., Znc. v. Williams, 754 So.2d 671, 680 (Fla.
2000) ("under proper analysis, the motion to amend was sufficient to stand in place of an
amended complaint and the action was, therefore, deemed commenced"); Perez v.
Paramount Communications, Inc., 709 N.E.2d 83, 86-87 (N.Y. 1999) (timeliness of
amended complaint is based on the date the motion to amend was filed); Frazier, 55
S.W.3d at 930 ("the motion to amend stands in place of the actual amended complaint
while the motion is under review by the court"); The Children's Store, 580 A.2d at 1209-

10 ("The state and federal courts that have confronted this question have held that an
action against a new party, brought in through amendment to a preexisting complaint, is
commenced when the motion to amend, and the new complaint, is filed even though
permission to make the amendment is given at a later date"); Mauney v. Morris, 340

S.E.2d 397,400 (N.C. 1986) ("The timely filing of the motion to amend, if later allowed, is
sufficient to start the action within the period of limitations"); A.M.C.B. v. Cox, 292
S.W.3d 428, 434-35 (Mo. App. 2009) (requirements for "commencing an action are met
when a lnotion to amend is filed even if the trial court does not grant the motion until after
the lilnitation period"); Toy v. Katz, 961 P.2d 1021, 1037 (Ariz.App. 1997) (motion to
amend constitutes "commence~nent"of an action); R.A. Jones & Sons, Inc. v. Holman, 470
So.2d 60, 65 (Fla. App. 1985) (for timeliness purposes, a motion to amend is "considered
filed at the time of filing the motion for leave to amend"); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Emsco
Homes, Inc.., 93 A.D.2d 874, 875 (N.Y. App.Div. 1983) ("service of a notice of lnotion
and the proposed amended complaint upon a defendant prior to the expiration of the
applicable Statute of Limitations timely interposes the claim or claims asserted in the
amended complaint"); Smith v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So.2d 878, 879 (Fla.App.
1976) (a motion for leave to amend filed within the statutory period stands in the place of
the actual amendment); see also 54 C.J.S. Limitations ofActions § 287 ("when a motion to
amend a complaint and a proposed amended cornplaint are filed prior to the running of the
statute of limitations, the motion to amend stands in place of the actual amended complaint
while the lnotion is under review by the trial court, and the fact that an order granting the
lnotion to anlend is entered after expiration of the statute of limitations does not make the
amended colnplaint untimely").

In support of its proposed alternative to the rule, Idaho Mutual points to Viajax
Corp. v. Stuckenbrock, 134 Idaho 65,995 P.2d 835 (Ct.App. 2000). In its brief on appeal,

Idaho Mutual asserts that in Viafax the Idaho Court of Appeals "expressly held" that the
filing of a motion to amend does not coilstitute the filing of a complaint. Appellant's Brief;
at 8. Following this assertion, Idaho Mutual added a block quote from the Viafax decision
purporting to demonstrate the claimed holding. Appellant's Brief; at 8-9.'
Viafax contains no such holding. Even if one were to analogize a motion to amend

the complaint with the coullterclaim at issue in that case, a reading of Viafax demonstrates
that the case is distiilguishable and does not contradict (or even pertain to) the national rule
that a tilnely filed motion to amend a complaint stands in place of the later amended
complaint.
The pertinent facts in Viafax were as follows: the defendant moved for leave to file
a counterclaim, and served this motion
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the plaintiff. Id. at 67-68, 995 P.2d at 837-38.

The plaintiff did not respond. Id. The district court granted the defendant's motion for
leave to file the counterclaim, but this order was not served on the plaintiff. Id. at 68, 995
P.2d at 838. Later, at a hearing conducted without notice to the plaintiff, the defendant
moved for a default judgment on the counterclaim since no responsive pleading had been
filed; the district court subsequently granted the motion for default. Id. When the plaintiff
learned that a default judgment had been entered against it, it moved to set aside the
judgment on the grounds that it had never been served with the coullterclaim and thus was

'

O l ~ eof sevcral difficulties with Idaho Mutual's use of Viafax is that the f i n f a decision did not involve or
discuss a motion to amend a complaint, but instead concerned a motion to file a counterclaim. Idaho
Mutual's solution to this problem was to remove the word "counterclaim" every time it appeared in the text
being quoted (five times) and I-eplace it with the bracketed wol-ds "amended complaint." Appellant's Brief; at
8-9. The actual text of the decision in Viafav does not, of course, contain Idaho Mutual's alterations, and
thus the 'express holding' claimed by Idaho Mutual does not exist.

not aware that a responsive pleading called for. Id. The trial court denied the plaintiffs
motion for relief, hut that ruling was reversed on appeal by the Idaho Court of Appeals. Id.

The Court of Appeals in Viafax reasoned that the plaintiff was entitled to relief
from the default judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(l) which provides such relief based
on "surprise." The Viafan plaintiff was "surprised" by the default judgment because the
plaintiff was never served with the order granting leave to file the counterclaim, nor was
the plaintiff served with the counterclaim itself. Id. Since the plaintiff was never given
notice that there was a counterclaim, the plaintiff was excused from having failed to file a
responsive pleading, and the grant of a default judgment against the plaintiff in Viafax was
judged improper. Id,
With the issues that were in dispute in Viufax in mind, it would be appropriate to
revisit the language from that decision on which Idaho Mutual relies. The full paragraph
from which Idaho Mutual selected a portion states as follows:
The district court focused upoil the fact that Viafax [the plaintiffj was
served with Stuckenhrock's [the defendant] motion for leave to file the
coulrterclaim. Viafax has acknowledged receipt of this motion and does not
challenge the validity of the service made on its attorney on the day of the
attorney's withdrawal. However, in our view the district court erred in
concluding that service of this motion alone was sufficient to put Viafax at
risk of a default judgment. Service of a motion for leave to file a
counterclaim, even with the proposed counterclaim attached, is not the
equivalent of service of the counterclaim itself. As Viafax argues, receipt of
the motion gave it notice only that it could object to a counterclaim being
filed and that the inotion might be granted. It remained possible that the
court would deny the motion, even without ail objection from Viafax, or
that Stuckenbrock would abandon the effort. Filing and service of the
counterclaim itself could be properly accomplished only uftev permission
had been obtained from the court. See I.R.C.P. 13(e); 15(d). Such service
was never performed.

Id. The court in Viafanwas discussing the requirement that a plaintiff must be

wit11

notice of a counterclaim (rather than only a motion for leave to file a counterclaim)
he can be required to submit a res~onsivepleading and before a default judgment can be
entered against him; it did not concern or discuss the point at which filing is effective to
commence an action for the purpose of timeliness.
In Nett, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted that the same principle
expressed in Viafax is actually consistent with the rule that an motion to amend
commences proceedings for the purposes of timeliness.

744 N.E.2d at 140-41.

Iininediately following a sentence in which the court wrote: "[wle adopt the more accurate
foimulation that the filing of the motion to amend actually commences the new action for
these purposes, with the motion to amend 'standling] in the place o f the amended
complaint," the court placed a footnote in which it observed that: "[w]hile the filing of the
motion 'commences' the action for purposes of satisfying a statute of repose, that filing
does not trigger the new defendant's obligation to serve a responsive pleading. That
obligation does not arise until the new defendant is served with the amended complaint,
which will not occur unless and until the motion to amend is allowed." Nett, 744 N.E.2d at
140-41 n.14 (internal citations omitted). In short then, a motion to amend (1) commences
proceedings and stands in the place of the later amended pleading for the purposes of
timeliness, but (2) the motion to amend does not trigger the other party's obligation to file
a responsive pleading, which does come due until after the motion is approved and the
amended pleading has been served. The first rule is determinative in this case. The second
is the principle applied in Viafax. As observed in Nett, both rules are correct, and the two
rules are entirely compatible. Nett, 744 N.E.2d at 140-41 n.14.

Accordingly, nothing in the Viafax decision contradicts, or is even relevant to, the
established rule that for the purposes of timeliness a motion to amend stands in the place of
an amended complaint while the motion is under review by the court. See, e.g., Nett, 774
N.E.2d 135-39; Mauney, 340 S.E.2d at 400-01; Buller Trucln'ng Co., 461 F.Supp.2d at
776-77.
The other decision that Idaho Mutual points to in its briefing is Diehl Lumber
Transportation, Inc., v. Miclzelson, 802 P.2d 739 (Utah.App. 1990). However, as the
district court in the present case noted, Diehl is distinguishable because that case concerned
a party seeking to file a third-party complaint against an unrelated party with no notice, and
revolved around the validity of a nzmc pro tune order. R., p. 83. Further, Dielzl is
inapplicable in light of Utah's unique statutory scheme, in which a claimant is required not
only to commence an action to enforce a lien within the statutory period, but also to record
a lispendens on the property within the same time frame. See Utah Code § 38-1-1 1(3)(a);
Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrft & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738, 752 (Utah
1990); see and compare I.C. 5 45-510.
Applying the established rule to the present case, Terra-West's timely filing of its
notion to amend stood in place of the amended complaint itself while the motion was

under review by the district court. Terra-West had control over the date it filed the motion
to anlend, but it could not control the timing of the court's subsequent ruling approving the
motion. If Terra-West or similarly situated litigants seeking to amend a complaint were
instead compelled to file and serve a new action against the same parties with respect to the
same contract, and to then consolidate the action, such a cumbersome work-around would
result in pointless procedural clutter and would waste time and judicial resources. "The

settled mle in both federal and state court is that an colnplaint is deemed filed as o f the
time it is submitted to a court together with a request for leave to file the amended
complaint."

Buller Trucking, 461 F.Supp.2d at 776-77.

Accordingly, Terra-West's

a~nendedcomplaint was timely filed, and the district court's order granting leave to amend
was not an abuse o f discretion.
B. Even if the filing of proceedings to enforce the Second Claim of Lien had itself
been untimely, it would relate back to the date of the original complaint because it
relates to the same transaction and occurrence which was already put at issue in
this litigation.

As discussed in the prior section, since the commencenlent o f proceedings to
enforce the Second Lien was itself timely, its validity is not dependent on either the timing
or the viability o f the claims described in the original complaint, including the foreclosure
claim on the First Lien. Consequently, i f the Court agrees that Terra-West's motion to
amend stood in place o f the later amended complaint, then the motion to amend was
properly granted and the analysis o f the present appeal need go no

I f , however, the Court were to determine that a motion to amend does

stand in

place o f the amended pleading while the motion is under review by the trial court, it would
then be necessary to consider whether Terra-West's amended complaint relates back to the
date o f the original complaint. The doctrine by which an amended pleading may relate
back to the date o f the original pleading is governed by Idaho Rule o f Civil Procedure
15(c). Rule 15(c) provides in pertinent part that "[w]henevera claim or defense asserted in
the amended pleading arose out o f the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or
The district court's iuling granting leave to amend was based on the second lien relating back to the date of
the original complaint pursuant to Ida110 Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). R. p. 83-85. That luling was comect
and should be upheld on appeal. The district court was not, however, asked to consider the ~ u l ethat an
amended complaint is deemed filed on the date of the motion to amend. That rule is presented on appeal
because ail appellate court may affirm the trial court on a theory not relied upon below. McCuslcey v. Canyon
Country, 123 Idaho 657,663,851 P.2d 953,959 (1993).

attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of
the original pleading." I.R.C.P. 15(c).
In the present case, if the amended complaint had been untimely any such defect
would be cured because the claims addressed in the amended pleading arose from the same
circumstances as the original complaint, and thus relate back to the date of the timely filed
original pleading. In ruling on the motion to amend, the district court below found that
"the [second] lien attached to the same real property and arose from the same tra~isaction
[as set forth in thc original complaint]. The Court finds that the claim arises out of the
transaction set forth in the original pleading and therefore amendment relates back to that
date." R. p. 84.
On appeal, Idaho Mutual has recast its 'relation back' argument away from its
former assertion that the amended complaint did not arise out of the same conduct,
transaction, or occurrence as the original pleading. Idaho Mutual's new argument is that
the amended complaint does not relate back "[b]ecause the Original Complaint did not
give notice of the Second Lien or that additional work might be performed pursuant to
Terra-West's contract for improvement to the Property[.]" Appellant's BuieL at 13. In
other words, Idaho Mutual's argument is that the amended complaint does not relate back
because the original complaint did not mention the Second Lien or the additional work on
the property that was performed after the original complaint was filed.
Idaho Mutual's argument stresses the requirement of "notice," contending that
Idaho Mutual did not receive notice of the Second Lien because it was not specifically

discussed in the original complaint.3 Idaho Mutual's argument, however, misunderstands
the role of "notice" in the context of the relation back doctrine.
First, it should be remembered that the test for relation back is whether the new
.claims asserted in the amended pleading "arose out of the conduct, transaction, or
occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading." FZerrera v.
Conner, 111 Idaho 1012, 1016-17, 729 P.2d 1075, 1079-80 (Ct.App. 1986). This
"common core of operative facts" imparts the defendant with notice as to claims arising
from those circuinstances. F.D.I.C. v. Jackson, 133 F.3d 694, 702 (9th Cir. 1998). It is the
original filing of a suit that places a defendant on notice that "the whole trailsaction
described in it will be fully sifted, by amendment if necd be, and that the form of the action
or the relief prayed or the law relied on will not be confined to their first statement." 6A
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure,

3

1497, 93 (2d ed. 1990) (quoting

Barthel v. Stamm, 145 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1944)).
Idaho Mutual's argument also depends on a suggestion that an amended pleading
cannot relate back unless those claims sought to be added were already contained in the
original pleading. It is not, however, necessary for the exact claims in the amended
pleading to be already contained in the original pleading, so long as the new claims arose
out the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence. See Herreua, 111 Idaho at 1018, 729
Terra-West understands Idaho Mutual's argument on appeal as concerning notice rather than the argument
presented below that the amended complaint did not arise from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence
as set forth in the original pleading. Such an argument was properly rejected below as impermissibly seeking
to litigate the merits of a claim on a motion lo amend. "A court may consider whether the allegations sought
to be added to the complaint slate a valid claim in determining whether to grant leave to amend the
complaint. A court, however, may not consider the sufficiency of evidence supporling the claim sought to be
added in determining leave to amend because that is more properly determined at the summary judgment
stage." Estate ofBeclcer v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 527-28, 96 P.3d 623, 628-29 (2004) (internal citations
omitted). "[Ilt is generally inappropriate to consider the substantive merits of the claim sought to be added
when passing on a motion to amend." Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Association, 126 Idaho 1002,
1013, 895 P.2d 1195,1206 (1995).

P.2d at 1081. Indeed, the very purpose of Rule 15 "is to allow amendments to expand or
cure defective pleadings." Id. at 1017, 729 P.2d at 1080. Logically, if, as Idaho Mutual
insists, an amended or supplemental claim would be disallowed if it was not already
contained in the original pleading, amended or supplemental claims could never relate
back. After all, if the original pleading already contained the claims or amendments being
added, there would be no need for the addition or amendment in the first place. This flaw
in the argument now being advanced by Idaho Mutual was aptly addressed in Scarfone v.
Martin, 442 So.2d 282,283 (Fla. App. 1983). The court wrote:
[Tlhe proper test of relation back of amendments is not whether the cause
of action stated in the amended pleading is identical to that stated in the
original (for in the strict sense almost any amendment may be said to be a
change of the original cause of action), but whether the pleading as
amended is based upon the same specific conduct, transaction, or
occurrence between the parties upon which the plaintiff tried to enforce
his original claim. If the amendment shows the same general factual
situation as that alleged in the original pleading, then the amendinent
relates back - even though there is a change in the precise legal
description of the rights sought to be enforced, or a change in the legal
theory upon which the action is brought.
Id. (quoting Keel v. Brown, 162 So.2d 321, 323 (Fla. App. 1964)).~
Idaho Mutual's apparent argument that the amended complaint does not relate back because it includes
claims for work on the property performed after the original complaint was filed is similarly without merit.
Amending a pleading pursuant to Rule 15 to add claims that have arisen since the date of the original
pleading is not barred, and does not inhibit relation back of the new claims. Such pleadings, to the extent that
they concern events subsequent to the original pleading, are called "supplemental pleadings." I.R.C.P. 15(d);
Mauney, 340 S.E.2d at 401 n.1 ("Supplemental pleadings are distinguished from amendments because they
deal with acts occurring after the filing of the complaint"). Supplen~entalpleadings are specifically permitted
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d), which provides that a party may "serve a supplemental
pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the date of the
pleading sought to be supplen~euted,whether or not the original pleading is defective in its statement of a
claim of relief," I.R.C.P. 15(d). "The clear weight of authority . . . in both the cases and the commentary,
permits the bringing of new claims in a supplemental complaint to promote the ecoilomical and speedy
disposition of the controversy." Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 1988).
Supplemental pleadings relate back to the date of the original pleading in the same manner as
alnendments to pleadings under Rule 15(c). See Duffv. Draper, 96 Idaho 299, 527 P.2d 1257 (1974) ("Rule
15(c), I.R.C.P., provides that amendments to pleadings are to relate back in time to the commencement of
suit, as are supplemental pleadings").

There is no question that the district court was correct in its determination that the
Amended Complaint arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as the
original Complaint. The amendment seeks only to add additional services and inaterials
rendered that were required under the oricrinal contract between Terra-West and Red
CliffIUrwin. The original pleading puts at issue labor and materials required under a
contract entered into in August of 2006. R. p. 9. The Amended Coinplaint notes that as of
November 30, 2007, Terra-West had performed all work required under the agreement,
excepting additional excavation and installation of certain pipeline and irrigation work
along and through the development, which could not be perfonned until certain approvals
from government authorities were obtained by Urwin. R. p. 91. I-Iowever, subsequent to
the original claim of lien's recording, Urwin obtained the necessary governmental approvals
and instructed Terra-West to complete the remaining work under its original agreement with
Red ClifFTUrwin. R. p. 91. Accordingly, Terra-West resumed its performance under the
original agreement, providing labor and materials for the improvement ofthe property. Thus,
while the amended pleading does relate to actions which occurred after the recording of the
original claim of lien, all of Terra-West's claims relate to the same original agreement
between Terra-West and Red ClifflUrwin.
For that reason, the cases cited by Ida110 Mutual once again are clearly distinguishable
from the amended pleading presented by Terra-West. Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss
Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 824 P.2d 841 (1991), sought to add a tort claim for

defamation to the already existing contract related claims. In this case, Terra-West has not
asserted any new theories of recovery. The original pleading asserts that it has provided
services and inaterials upon real property, pursuant to an agreement with the owner, for which

it has not been paid. The amended pleading simply adds the work that Terra-West performed
pursuant to the same agreement. Terra-West has not changed the theory of its case between
the amended pleading and the original pleading as the proposed amendment in Idaho First
National sought to do.
Likewise, in Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 688 P.2d 1172 (1984), the proposed
amendment sought to add post-filing facts that did not relate to the facts presented in the
original litigation, but rather "occurred at a different time and location." Wing, 107 Idaho at
270, 688 P.2d at 1175. Terra-West's claims are not at a different time and location. The
amendments concern acts rendered by Terra-West upon the same property, pursuant to the
same agreement which is already put in issue by the existing litigation.
It is well recognized that new theories of recovery may be raised when the basic
facts that give rise to the recovery have not changed. Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98
Idaho 266, 272-73, 561 P.2d 1299, 1305-06 (1977). The basic facts giving rise to TerraWest's claims have not changed. Terra-West seeks recovery of amounts for labor and
materials that it provided pursuant to an agreement made in August of 2006. The identity
of the parties has not changed and, in point of fact, neither has Terra-West's theories of
recovery. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the
amended complaint arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence at issue in the
original pleading and therefore relates back to that date.
C. The District Court had jurisdiction to grant Terra-West's motion for leave to
amend because the motion was timely and because no final order has been issued
in this action.
Idaho Mutual asserts that the district court does not have the jurisdictional power to
enforce the Second Lien because, in Idaho Mutual's view, Terra-West failed to initiate an

action for foreclose the lien within the six-month period provided in Idaho Code § 45-510.
Idaho Mutual's argument, however, is without merit because Terra-West did commence
proceedings to enforce the lien within the statutory period.
Terra-West substantially completed work on the subject property on May 25,2008.
The Second Claim of Lien was filed on August 12, 2008, and copies were served on the
owners or reputed owners of the property. This filing was less than 90 days after work was
completed, and was thus timely under Idaho Code § 45-507. Then, on January 16, 2009,
Terra-West filed a motion to amend its complaint so as to enforce the Second Claim of
Lien. This motion was filed approximately five months after the Claim of Lien was
recorded, and was accordingly timely under the six-month limit contained in Idaho Code 5
45-510.
As discussed in greater detail in section V(a) above, the filing of a motion to amend
constitutes the commencement of an action for the purposes of timeliness, with the motion
to amend standing in place of the amended complaint while under review by the court.
E.g., Nett, 774 N.E.2d at 140; Mayes, 867 F.2d at 1173; Wallace, 720 F.Supp. at 159;
Longo, 618 F.Supp. at 89; Mauney, 340 S.E.2d at 400; Toy, 961 P.2d at 1037; Totura
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Co, 754 So.2d at 680; Mauney, 340 S.E.2d at 400; Frazier, 55 S.W.3d at 929-30; The
Children's Store, 580 A.2d at 1210. As a result, Terra-West's January 16, 2009 filing of
the motion to amend the complaint constituted the commencement of proceedings to
enforce the Second Lien against the Defendants. The Second Lien was therefore timely
under Idaho Code 5 45-510 and the court was fully vested with jurisdiction to grant leave
to amend the Complaint.

Even if the amended complaint had not itself been timely filed, as discussed in
greater detail in section V(b) above, it would have related back to the date of the original
Complaint. Determination of whether an amended pleading relates back does not hinge on
whether it is restricted by a statute of limitations or of repose, but instead depends on the
same factors that normally govern the relation back doctrine. Estate of Spell, 622 S.E.2d
725,728 (N.C. App. 2005).
Further, the district court has never lost jurisdiction over Terra-West's Complaint,
or even over the First Claim of Lien. On motion from Idaho Mutual, the district court
dismissed Terra-West's First Claim of Lien on the basis of an alleged technical error in the
jurat. R. p. 31-36. The dismissal was not, however, a final order. As noted by the district
court in its ruling granting leave to amend, Idaho Mutual did not request, nor did it receive,
a Rule 54@) certificate of Final Judgment removing it from the action. R. p. 84.
Similarly, and for the same reason, no final order has ever been entered with
respect to the dismissal of the First Claim of Lien and the district court retains its
jurisdiction over that claim. The present appeal is interlocutory, and was granted on
motion from Idaho Mutual by the Supreme Court pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12.
Since no final judgment has ever been issued in this case, nothing has interrupted the
district court's jurisdiction.

Indeed, until a final order is issued, (and for 14 days

afterward) Terra-West retains the ability to file a motion for reconsideration regarding the
First Claim of Lien, and the district court retains the jurisdiction to entertain that motion and potentially modify or reverse its earlier ruling of dismissal. I.R.C.P. 1l(a)(2)(B) ("A
motioil for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made at any
time before the entry of final judgment but not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry

of final judgment"); Devil Creek Ranch, Inc. v. Cedar Mesa Reservoir & Canal Co., 126
Idaho 202,879 P.2d 1135 (1994).'
There is no question that Terra-West's filing of the original pleading was timely.
Rule 15 was specifically created "to allow amendments to expand or cure defective
pleadings" such as in the present case. See Herrera, 111 Idaho at 1018, 729 P.2d at 1081.
Since the district court never lost jurisdiction over Idaho Mutual or over Terra-West's
original Complaint, the district court had, and has, jurisdiction to apply the doctrine of
relation back to the amended complaint.
D. Idaho Mutual is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal.
Idaho Mutual requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 5 12-121 and
Idaho Appellate Rule 41. Idaho Appellate Rule 41 outlines the rules for requesting
attorney fees, but does not itself provide a basis on which fees can be awarded. Shawver v.
Huckleberry Estates, 140 Idaho 354, 365, 93 Idaho 685,696 (2004). Idaho Code 5 12-121
permits an award of attorney fees in a civil action to the prevailing party if the court
determines the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation. Mutual ofEnumclaw Ins. Co. v. Pedersen, 133 Idaho 135, 139, 983 P.2d 208,
212 (1999). This action has not been defended frivolously by Terra-West, and, indeed,
Terra-West is the responding party having been granted a favorable ruling on its motion to
amend by the district court below.

It sl~ouldhe noted that the question of whether or not the First Claim of Lien was valid is not determinative
in the present appeal. Tile district court ruled that the amended complaint relates hack to the "original
simply to that
of the original pleading that described the
pleading" - the entire original pleading First Claim of Lien. R. p. 84. The original pleading concerned the same property and the same conduct,
transaction, or occurre~~ce
as the amended complaint and consequently serves as a basis for relation hack
pursuant to Rule 15(c). See R. p. 6-13; I.R.C.P. 15(c). As a result, the amended complaint would relate hack
to the original pleading even if the First Claim of Lien were invalid, and, indeed, even if the First Claim of
Lien had never existed.

E. Terra-West should be granted attorney's fees on appeal.
Idaho Mutual requests an award of reasonable attorney fees on appeal pursuant to
Idaho Code

-.
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12-121, which provides for such an award if the court determines the case

was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.

Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 133 Idaho at 139, 983 P.2d at 212. Idaho Mutual's
interlocutory appeal is frivolous in light of the well established rule that a motion to amend
stands in the place of an amended pleading for the purposes of timeliness, and the clear
absence of any abuse of discretion in the district court's determination that the claims in
the amended complaint arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth
in the original pleading.
V I . CONCLUSION

Terra-West respectfully requests that the Court affirm the district court's
discretionary grant of leave to file an amended complaint. Terra-West further requests an
award of costs and attorney fees on appeal.
DATED this 8'" day of December, 2009.
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